(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities by Michelsen, Claus et al.
This file was downloaded from the institutional repository BI Brage - 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi (Open Access) 
 
 
 
(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence 
from German municipalities  
 
Claus Michelsen 
Halle Institute for Economic Research 
Peter Boenisch 
Martin-Luther-University 
Benny Geys  
BI Norwegian Business School  
Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
 
 
This is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article 
published in 
 
Public Choice, 159(2014)3-4: 469-483 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0061-2 
 
 
 
 
 The publisher, Springer, allows the author to retain rights to self-archive 
the final version of his/her article (but not Springer's PDF version) on 
his/her own website and/or the repository of his/her institution, after 12 
months from official publication. The final publication is available at 
www.springerlink.com (Publisher’s policy 2012). 
 
(De)Centralization and Voter Turnout: Theory 
and Evidence from German Municipalities 
 
Claus Michelsen a, Peter Boenisch a,b and Benny Geys c,d 
 
a Halle Institute for Economic Research, Department of Urban Economics, P.O. 
Box 11 03 61, D-06017 Halle (Saale), Germany 
b Martin-Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Grosse Steinstrasse 73, D-06099 
Halle (Saale), Germany 
c Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Department of Applied Economics, Pleinlaan 2, B-
1050 Brussel, Belgium 
d Norwegian Business School BI, Department of Economics, Nydalsveien 37, N-
0442 Oslo, Norway 
 
Abstract  
A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of 
elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we 
exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of 
public good provision – and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative 
competences across government levels – likewise affects voters’ turnout decisions by influencing 
the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across 
German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence. 
Keywords: Voter turnout, Institutions, Federalism, Paradox of voting. 
JEL-Classification: D70, D72, H11, H40 
Corresponding author: Benny Geys; Phone: 0047 4641 0923; Email: Benny.Geys@bi.no. 
1 
1. Introduction 
The question why people participate in elections has triggered much debate 
among both political scientists and economists. Particularly explaining the level of 
turnout in most elections proves challenging. Theories based on a rational 
comparison of costs and benefits (inspired by Downs 1957) indeed predict large-
scale abstention on Election Day, since the probability of bringing about one’s 
preferred outcome is in most cases extremely small. As this clearly goes against 
the empirical observation that many people do vote, various authors have 
introduced an additional benefit due to ‘expressive utility’ (Brennan and Lomasky 
1993; Brennan and Hamlin 2000; Hillman 2010; Jennings and Hamlin 2011) to 
escape the ‘paradox of voting’ (Riker and Ordeshook 1968: p. 31). 
Considerable progress has, however, been made in explaining voters’ turnout 
decisions at the margin (Matsusaka 1995; Geys 2006a; Andersen et al. 2012). 
That is, a large number of factors have been identified as important in just tipping 
the balance between abstention and voting in an individual’s decision-making 
process (for overviews, see Blais 2006; Geys 2006a,b). A significant share of this 
literature focuses on how a jurisdiction’s institutional setting affects voters’ cost-
benefit calculation. Still, much of this ‘institutional’ literature concentrates on the 
effects of diverse voting systems (e.g., compulsory voting, registration systems, 
quorum rules, concurrent elections, computerized voting) using cross-country 
comparisons (e.g., Roseman and Stephenson 2005; Aguiar-Conraria and 
Magalhães 2010). In this article, we instead analyze the impact of the institutional 
design of (local) public good provision.  
To the best of our knowledge, only one previous study deals with a similar topic. 
Hajnal and Lewis (2003) show that outsourcing municipal tasks negatively affects 
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voter turnout because, so their argument goes, it induces a loss of political 
influence among local governments (which reduces voters’ benefits of casting 
their ballots). We take a more general approach inspired by the literature on fiscal 
federalism and public finance, and evaluate the impact of the distribution of 
political and administrative competences for (local) public good provision. Even 
though such institutions have long been acknowledged to matter for the efficiency 
of public good provision (Tullock 1965; Olson 1969; Oates 1972; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980), its effect on voter turnout has not been analyzed. Yet, as we will 
argue in more detail below, different institutional frameworks for the provision of 
public goods influence voters’ expected benefits of voting, and thus are likely to 
affect turnout decisions ‘at the margin’.  
We assess the ensuing theoretical predictions using German local elections as our 
empirical test case. Compared to cross-country studies, this local setting allows 
analyzing turnout variation in a more homogenous socio-cultural environment, 
such that we can concentrate on the institutional variation in which we are 
interested. Moreover, Germany provides an ideal setting for our purposes since 
governments at the LAU 1 level1 have an almost identical range of public 
administrative tasks across the German nation, but show wide diversity in terms 
of local self-administration (i.e., who is elected to decide if, how and how much of 
a fixed set of public goods should be provided). Our main results suggest that – in 
line with theoretical predictions – centralized decisions over all types of public 
goods within the municipality depresses turnout in municipal elections, while a 
1  LAU stands for ‘Local Authority Unit’ and is a classification issued by Eurostat. While LAU 2 
is the municipal level, LAU 1 captures different forms of inter-municipal cooperation. 
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federal government structure (which ties political decision-making authority more 
closely to the geographic reach of different public goods) increases voter turnout. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the theoretical background, and brings forward our central research hypotheses. 
Section 3 brings forward the empirical approach, while section 4 presents our 
main findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In section 2.1, we build on the fiscal federalism literature to introduce three 
distinct institutional systems for (local) public good provision wherein the public 
goods involved have varying geographical reaches. While these are currently 
employed to differing extents in Germany (see below) as well as other countries, 
they can here best be viewed as three archetypes. In section 2.2, we discuss their 
effects on voter turnout using the standard Downsian framework. As mentioned, 
we thereby aim to derive hypotheses (summarized in section 2.3) explaining 
turnout decisions at the margin, rather than absolute levels of turnout. 
2.1 Types of local public governance 
Olson’s (1969) principle of fiscal equivalence holds that there should be 
“congruence between the geographical scopes of government actions and their 
financing” (Enderlein 2009: 3). A similar idea is captured in Oates’s (1972, 1999) 
decentralization theorem, which argues that “the provision of public services 
should be located at the lowest level of government encompassing […] the 
relevant benefits and costs” (Oates 1999: 1122). A radical interpretation of these 
ideas would involve the implementation of different governments for nearly every 
public good, which is untenable due to the excessive costs of such a multitude of 
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administrations. Consequently, different institutional designs can be observed in 
reality for the provision of the same set of ‘local’ public goods (where the 
apostrophes indicate that the geographic reach of different local public goods may 
vary).2 These institutional settings can be categorized in roughly three prototypes, 
which differ with respect to who is elected to decide if, how and how much local 
public goods should be provided. 
The first type of government – which we refer to as ‘centralized municipalities’ – 
concentrates all competencies in public good provision at one central level of 
local government, such that the differing geographic reaches of various local 
public goods simply are ignored. That is, decisions on the amount of public good 
provision are taken and implemented by one encompassing municipal parliament, 
which is elected in one single election. We illustrate this on the left-hand side of 
Figure 1. The municipal borders are represented by the dark black line, and 
indicate the boundary of public goods benefiting the entire municipal population 
(referred to as ‘municipal’ public goods). The thin grey lines represent the 
boundaries of more localized public goods whose benefits only accrue to one 
intra-municipal community (referred to as ‘community’ public goods).3 These 
intra-municipal communities do not, however, have their own representative 
bodies to decide over community public goods. Hence, both community and 
municipality public goods are decided and administered under central control 
(reflected by the fact that both are colored in a common grey shade in Figure 1). 
2  For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that there are two types of public goods: i) one 
where the costs/benefits are localized to a small subgroup within the municipality (e.g., child 
care centers, local parks) and ii) one where the costs/benefits cover the entire municipality 
(e.g., municipal roads). 
3  In the German setting analyzed below, these communities often reflect previously independent 
municipalities that merged into one new (larger) municipality. 
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____________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
____________________ 
The second type of government – which we refer to as ‘federal municipalities’ – 
comes closer to the ideal-type described under the decentralization theorem, and 
consists of two bodies of government: i.e., one with responsibility over 
community public goods, and one with responsibility over municipal public 
goods. This setting is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 1 by the white and 
grey shades, respectively. Although the competencies within the municipality 
remain the same as before, the internal organization thereof is different. That is, 
there are now two independently elected parliaments deciding upon the amount of 
community and municipality public goods, respectively. Citizens therefore also 
have two votes (which, in the German case, are cast on the same Election Day): 
i.e., one to elect the members of the community council administering community 
public goods, and one to elect the members of the municipal parliament 
administering municipal public goods.  
Finally, the center of Figure 1 depicts the intermediate situation of ‘confederal 
municipalities’. These concentrate political authority over public good provision 
predominantly at the local level in the sense that each community within the 
municipality elects its own parliament, which is then – as in federal municipalities 
– solely responsible for community public goods (as indicated by the white areas 
in Figure 1). Unlike federal municipalities, however, there is no directly elected 
municipal government, but rather a joint administrative council with deputies sent 
by each community within the municipality, which decides consensually about 
municipal public goods. Hence, as for centralized municipalities, voters have only 
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one vote. This elects the community council directly, and affects indirectly the 
composition of the joint administrative council at the municipal level. 
2.2 Effects on voter turnout 
To evaluate the effect of such institutional differences in local public good 
provision, we start from classical rational voter theory (Downs 1957), where the 
net benefit of voting (R) is: 
R = ρB – C (1)  
In Eq. (1), B = UY – UZ is the difference in expected utility from the policy 
alternatives proposed by parties Y and Z, respectively;4 C is the cost of voting 
arising from, for example, gathering information and getting to the polling booth; 
and ρ is the probability of being pivotal in favor of one’s most desired policy. 
Note that we hereby follow Matsusaka’s (1995) interpretation of the meaning of 
ρ, rather than the slightly more restrictive Downsian version (i.e., ρ as the 
probability of being pivotal in the political decision-making process versus the 
probability of being pivotal in the election). While both interpretations are 
equivalent under majority rule (absent political agency effects), Matsusaka’s 
(1995) interpretation is more appropriate under non-majoritarian systems 
characterized by coalitions, bargaining and/or logrolling since simply tipping the 
election might not be sufficient to bring about one’s most desired policy (this will 
be particularly relevant in our empirical setting below). 
4  Although we introduce only two parties (Y and Z) in our model formulation, the Downsian 
model – and our use of it here – can easily be extended to a setting with multiple parties and 
coalition formation (see McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972; Geys and Heyndels 2006). As this 
does not add additional theoretical insights, but complicates the notation, we refrain from doing 
so here. 
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Introducing institutional differences in public good provision in this framework, 
and evaluating how these affect individuals’ turnout decisions at the margin 
(Matsusaka 1995; Geys 2006a; Andersen et al. 2012) requires some additional 
notation. First, utility can derive from community (Ucom) or municipal public good 
consumption (Umun), and each of two parties (Y and Z) promises to produce a 
certain amount of each of these goods (also subscripted by com and mun, 
respectively). Second, elections can be held within each community (among its 
ncom voters) and/or within the municipality as a whole (among its nmun voters), 
where the municipal electorate is the sum of all communities’ sub-electorates 
(nmun = ⅀ncom). Finally, we assume that the individual costs of voting are 
independent of institutional design of local public good provision, and are 
identical across the municipal types. 
Introducing these elements into Eq. (1) according to the institutional attributes of 
centralized municipalities leads to the following net benefit from voting in such 
municipalities: 
RCen = ρmun . |(UY,mun + UY,com) – (UZ,mun + UZ,com)| – C (2)  
Voters thus choose the party (Y or Z) offering the optimal bundle of community 
and municipality public goods. Since in this case there is only one election held at 
the municipal level, the probability of being decisive in favor of one’s desired 
policy bundle is ρmun. 
Similarly, for federal municipalities, Eq. (1) becomes: 
RFed = ρcom . |UY,com – UZ,com| + ρmun . |UY,mun –  UZ,mun)| – C (3)  
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Voters are now able to cast separate votes for the community and municipality 
councils. Hence, a vote for a certain community policy (which is pivotal with 
probability ρcom) is unconditional on, and thus additively separable from, the 
choice of a municipal policy (which is pivotal with probability ρmun). 
Finally, for confederal municipalities, there is only one community-level election, 
in which a voter must choose the party (Y or Z) offering the optimal bundle of 
community and municipality public goods. One’s vote is pivotal for the 
community policy choice (|UY,com – UZ,com|) with probability ρcom. Moreover, 
through the selection of the members of the joint administrative council from the 
community councils (see above), a vote also influences municipal public good 
provision (|UY,mun –  UZ,mun|) with some probability that depends on the probability 
of being pivotal in the community election, i.e., ρmun = f(ρcom)). Still, as each voter 
has only one vote and thus has to evaluate the overall benefit |(UY,mun + UY,com) – 
(UZ,mun + UZ,com)| on Election Day, the probability of being pivotal for this overall 
benefit becomes a more complicated function of ρcom. Hence, Eq. (1) becomes: 
RCon = h(ρcom, f(ρcom)) . |(UY,mun + UY,com) – (UZ,mun + UZ,com)| – C (4)  
Using Equations (2), (3), and (4), two important effects of the institutional design 
of public good provision can be distinguished for a given set of public policy 
offers by both parties. The first relates the benefit-term B, and second is related to 
the probability term ρ. 
2.2.1 The benefit of voting (B) 
Comparing Equations (2), (3), and (4), the benefit term in the voter’s calculation 
is clearly the same in confederal and centralized municipalities. That is, since 
voters only have one vote, they have to optimize the expected payoff by choosing 
9 
the party offering the best policy bundle at the community and the municipal 
level: i.e., BCon = BCen = |(UY,mun + UY,com) – (UZ,mun + UZ,com)|. In federal 
municipalities, however, voters have two votes and can optimize by choosing 
their preferred policy at the community and the municipal level: BFed = |UY,com – 
UZ,com| + |UY,mun –  UZ,mun)|. It follows directly that the benefit of voting (B) in 
federal municipalities is never less than that in confederal or centralized 
municipalities, and is likely to be higher: BFed ≥ BCon = BCen. This is illustrated 
with a simple numerical example in Figure 2.  
____________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
____________________ 
2.2.2 The probability of being pivotal (ρ) 
A vote is decisive when it creates or breaks an exact tie in favor of one’s preferred 
policy outcome (Matsusaka 1995). Commonly, this is argued to be an inverse 
function of the electorate’s size and a direct function of the election’s closeness 
(Beck 1975; Owen and Grofman 1984; Hansen et al. 1987; Dhillon and Peralta 
2002). However, as mentioned, moving beyond a unitary system with majoritarian 
voting (i.e., the standard Downsian setting), this probability will also be affected 
by the precise institutional design. 
Clearly, the three types of local public governance discussed in section 2.1 
influence the number of eligible voters deciding upon public good provision at the 
community and municipality level. Specifically, in centralized municipalities, 
elections are held only at the level of the municipality. Hence, the number of 
voters is nmun. In both confederal and federal municipalities, elections either only 
or also take place at the community level, with ncom voters. As by definition nmun > 
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ncom, the probability of casting a decisive vote is larger in the latter two systems 
compared to centralized municipalities. Moreover, in federal and confederal 
municipalities, voters can influence community-level policies directly and also 
can affect the bargaining power at the municipal level (via the municipal vote in 
federal municipalities and via one’s community representation at the municipal 
level in confederal municipalities). This results in a great chance of being pivotal 
on overall public policy than in centralized municipalities. In other words, even 
for a given size of the electorate, a voter becomes more powerful in federal and 
confederal settings compared to a centralized setting.5 The direct implication is 
that the probability of affecting the policy outcome is least in centralized 
municipalities. 
Comparing the chances of being pivotal in federal and confederal municipalities is 
not straightforward as this depends on how ρmun (under the federal system) relates 
to f(ρcom) under the confederal system (see above). To the extent that, compared to 
federal municipalities, the effect of a smaller electorate in confederal 
municipalities is roughly compensated by the representative character of the joint 
administrative council, we have that: ρFed ≈ ρCon > ρCen. It is important to point 
out, however, that the exact relative size of ρFed versus ρCon is innocuous for our 
key predictions as long as their magnitudes do not outweigh the difference in the 
benefits of voting (B) in both governance types (see below). 
5  In the German setting, this is particularly true since decisions at the municipal level are taken 
consensually. Moreover, from a legal perspective, all communities remain independent and can 
oppose any decision of the joint administrative council by exercising their veto right. While 
that option provides a strong threat and determines each community’s bargaining power at the 
municipal level, it is an extremely rare occurrence in reality. 
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2.3 Hypotheses 
To summarize, this discussion leads to the following hypotheses. First, based on 
our arguments regarding the effects of institutional design on both the benefit of 
voting (BFed ≥ BCon = BCen) and the probability of influencing the election 
outcome (ρFed ≈ ρCon > ρCen),6 we hypothesize that: 
(H1a)  Compared to confederal and centralized provision of local public 
goods, voter turnout is highest under federal provision.  
(H1b)  Compared to federal and confederal provision of local public goods, 
voter turnout is least under fully centralized provision. 
The intuition underlying H1a is that federal municipalities allow voters to express 
a distinct preference for a certain set of preferred policies (possibly offered by two 
different parties), rather than have to choose a single party that may not 
implement their preferred policy for both public goods. This increases the benefit 
of voting (B). At the same time, voters’ probability of being pivotal in bringing 
such optimal outcome about (ρ) is at least as large in federal municipalities as in 
the centralized and confederal systems. Similarly, the intuition for H1b is that 
voters’ probability of being pivotal (ρ) are lowest in this system. Moreover, the 
benefit from voting (B) is at most as great as under the federal and confederal 
systems.  
6  Remember that these orderings are derived independently of the effects different institutional 
settings may have on electorate size and election closeness (i.e., the traditional determinants of 
ρ). In our empirical analysis below, we will therefore test the ensuing hypotheses H1a and H1b 
controlling for these two elements. 
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3. Empirical implementation 
3.1 Empirical model and data 
We evaluate the hypotheses formulated above using a large sample of German 
municipalities. Germany provides an ideal setting for such test since governments 
at the LAU 1 level have an almost identical range of public administrative tasks 
across the German nation, but differ in terms of local self-administration 
(conforming to the three governance types described above).7 Our data derive 
from the German Federal Statistical Office. While the original dataset covers all 
German municipalities at the LAU 1 level (over 4550 municipalities), we impose 
two restrictions. First, we drop all observations from so-called ‘kreisfreie Staedte’ 
(i.e., large independent cities) and from the city states of Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg. The reason is that these entities carry out additional tasks at higher 
administrative levels (county and state), and thus are not fully comparable to the 
other municipalities in our sample. Second, we restrict the sample to local 
elections that took place in the national legislative period between 2002 and 2005 
to ensure sufficiently comparable political conditions at the national level.8 With 
some additional municipalities falling from the sample due to data availability 
issues, our final dataset consists of 1,660 municipalities from seven German 
federal states (see Table 1). 
____________________ 
7  For more details on Germany’s federal system, municipal tasks and comparisons of municipal 
types, we refer the interested reader to Biehl (1994), Zimmermann (1999) and Rosenfeld et al. 
(2007), respectively. 
8 This issue is strengthened by the fact that the 2005 national election was originally scheduled 
for 2006. As the rescheduling was announced by Chancellor Schroeder in May 2005, the 
campaign for the national election of 2005 did not affect the local elections contained in our 
sample that were held in 2004. This restriction excludes observations from Bavaria (which held 
local-level elections in 2002 and 2008) and Lower Saxony (with local-level elections in 2001 
and 2006). 
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Table 1 about here 
____________________ 
We use this dataset to estimate the following baseline model:  
ii
Fed
iFed
Cen
iCeni XDDTurnout υβϕϕα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= , (5) 
where Turnouti reflects voter turnout in municipality i (defined as the number of 
votes cast divided by the eligible population), Xi is a vector of control variables 
(discussed in the next section), α, ϕCen, ϕFed and β are a set of parameters to be 
estimated, and υi denotes an i.i.d. error component. Our main variables of interest 
are two dummy variables, CeniD  and
Fed
iD , which indicate whether municipality i 
is a centralized or federal Municipality, respectively (confederal municipalities are 
the reference group). To assess our hypothesis, we first perform a test on the 
parameters ϕCen and ϕFed to evaluate whether both are jointly different from zero. 
With respect to hypotheses H1a and H1b, we expect ϕCen and ϕFed to be 
significantly negative and positive, respectively. 
Taking advantage of the existing literature, Xi includes an elaborate pool of 
covariates that might affect the utility and/or cost of voting (for an extensive 
review, see Geys 2006b). First of all, we control for the size of the municipal 
electorate, as well as the average size of the community-level sub-electorates 
(including squared terms to account for possible non-linearities). Then, we capture 
the closeness of an election by computing the difference in the vote shares of the 
winner and the runner-up in the election.9 This ex-post measurement of closeness 
9  Although restricting ourselves to the relative size of the first two parties in our measure of 
closeness may be overly restrictive in our multi-party setting, measures explicitly aimed at 
incorporating the vote (or seat) shares of multiple parties such as the ‘entropy’-measure 
proposed in Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992) and Kirchgässner and Zu Himmern 
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is driven by the fact that ex-ante data are, unfortunately, not available, i.e., no 
polls exist at the municipal level and significant changes in the municipal 
structure prevent the use of historical election outcomes as proxies. We should 
note here that these controls for size and closeness imply that the municipality-
type dummies in our estimation pick up all institutional effects on both B and ρ 
(as defined in the theoretical section above) that exist in addition to these two 
elements.10 
To accommodate the idea that social pressures and interpersonal bonds are likely 
to vary between rural and urban areas (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Overbye 
1995), we include population density (defined as the number of inhabitants per 
km2). As social pressures may likewise be affected by the stability (Hoffmann-
Martinot et al. 1996; Ashworth et al. 2006) and/or homogeneity of the population 
(Cohen 1982; Zimmer 1976), we also control for population mobility – defined as 
the sum of in- and out-migration divided by the number of inhabitants – and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the age structure.11 
(1997), i.e., )ln(
1 i
n
i i
ppE ∑ =−= with pi the vote (or seat) share of party i, are problematic 
as well since they generally depend on the number of parties included in its calculation (which 
clearly contaminates their measurement of size inequalities between the parties). As there is no 
commonly accepted solution to this problem, to the best of our knowledge, we gave preference 
to the relative simplicity of the two-party vote difference. 
10  Since some federal states aggregate information on the vote share of non-partisan candidates in 
their official statistics, the share of such non-partisans can become quite large in our sample. 
To avoid this biasing our estimate of the election closeness effect, we enter a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the share of non-partisan votes exceeds 33% of all votes. 
11  In most previous work, population homogeneity is approximated by either racial/ethnic or 
income diversity. Unfortunately, we lack detailed information for both these indicators. Hence, 
we instead rely on age dispersion as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: ⅀i xi2 , 
where xi is the share of citizens in a specific age class (age: <3, 3-6, 6-10, 10-15, 15-18, 18-20, 
20-25, 25-30, …, 65-75, >75). 
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Given the generally accepted importance of income and education on voter 
turnout (Verba and Nie 1972; Pelkonen 2012), we include the share of 
educationally highly-qualified (defined as the share of population with university 
degree) and low-qualified inhabitants (defined as the share of population without 
vocational training and without secondary school education) as well as the share 
of long- and short-term unemployed people in our model. We also include 
dummies equal to 1 when the local election takes place alongside EU or state-
level elections to control for the fact that concurrent (higher-level) elections tend 
to boost voter turnout (Geys 2006b). Finally, the remaining unobserved level 
effects across the German territory are accounted for by an East Germany dummy 
(which captures all municipalities located in the area of the former GDR) as well 
as three more federal state dummies (other state-level indicator variables are 
dropped to avoid linear dependency). Detailed definitions and descriptive 
statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2. 
____________________ 
Table 2 about here 
____________________ 
3.2 Econometric issues 
As our dependent variable (i.e., turnout) is by definition bounded between zero 
and one, we require an estimation method that is able to deal with fractional 
response variables. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is inappropriate since it 
implicitly ignores the bounded nature of the dependent variable and assumes a 
constant effect for all explanatory variables on turnout over its entire range. 
Moreover, the predicted values from OLS regression cannot be guaranteed to lie 
within the 0-1 interval (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). Although frequently 
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employed, Tobit or logit models also do not solve the specific problems of 
fractional dependent variables satisfactorily. Applying a two-limit Tobit ensures 
that the predicted values lie within the unit interval, but this is true by definition 
and not caused by censoring (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003). A logit 
transformation makes it difficult to recover the dependent variable from the 
original conditional mean function, which is the main point of interest in our study 
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996). 
Given that we have no observations on the boundary values of zero and one (see 
Table 2), two main approaches for estimating Eq. (5) can be considered. The first 
involves estimating the conditional mean function by maximum likelihood 
assuming a beta-distribution. The latter approach is consistent, asymptotically 
normally distributed and fully efficient if the assumed conditional density is 
correctly specified. Most researchers use a mean-dispersion parameterization of 
the beta-density suggested by Paolino (2001) and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) 
to simplify the interpretation of the parameter estimates. In this specification, a 
functional form is modelled separately for the mean and the dispersion. The beta 
density can then be parameterized as:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )1 11| , 1
1
ii
i i i i
i
f turnout turnout turnout µ φµ φ
φ
µ φ
φ µ φ
− −−Γ= −
Γ Γ −    (6) 
with ( )i iE turnout µ=       and      
( ) ( )
1
1
i i
iVar turnout
µ µ
φ
−
=
+ , (7) 
where Γ(.) is the gamma function, 0 < Turnouti < 1, 0 < µi < 1 and φ > 1. The 
mean of the dependent variable now can be modelled using different link 
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functions, which ensure that its expected value is bounded by 0 and 1. Using the 
logit link function, we obtain: 
( )
'
'| 1
i
i
z
i i i z
eE turnout z
e
π
πµ= = + , (8) 
where zi stands for a matrix of all explanatory variables in Eq. (5), including the 
dummy variables, and π subsumes the corresponding parameter vector. As 
mentioned earlier, the critical drawback of this approach is that it yields 
inconsistent parameter estimates when the conditional density of the dependent 
variable is incorrectly specified. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) therefore suggest a 
quasi-parametric regression model, which assumes only that: 
( | ) ( )i i iE turnout z G z π=  (9) 
The known non-linear function G(.) satisfies 0 ≤ G(.) ≤ 1. For our analysis, we 
follow previous research and choose G(.) to be the logistic function. Particularly, 
we employ the quasi-maximum likelihood method based on the Bernoulli log-
likelihood function proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which is 
consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the true distribution of 
Turnouti on zi, given that E(Turnouti | zi) is correctly specified. This quasi-
parametric approach does not rely on the specification of the full distribution of 
f(Turnouti | zi, π).12 
12  We carried out both estimation procedures, but focus on the quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QMLE) results below. The reason is that some evidence suggests that even if the beta 
assumption is valid, the maximum likelihood approach outperforms the QMLE estimator only 
in certain circumstances (Ramalho et al. 2011). Moreover, to verify that our results are not 
driven by this particular choice of econometric method, we also performed a further  
robustness check building on a traditional OLS estimation with a logit-transformed dependent 
variable (i.e., log(turnout/(1-tunrout))) and Huber-White corrected standard errors. The results 
remained almost identical (details available upon request). 
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4. Results 
Our central results using QMLE are presented in Table 3 (though similar results 
were achieved using the beta-regression model, available upon request) and 
indicate the high explanatory power of the model (R2 = 0.672). Starting with our 
central institutional variables, we first of all find that a joint test on the parameters 
ϕCen and ϕFed confirms their joint significance (p<0.0001). This provides evidence 
that the institutional design of local public good provision has a strong influence 
on voter turnout. Moreover, in line with our theoretical expectations, we find that 
voter turnout is highest in federal municipalities (see hypothesis H1a) and lowest 
in centralized municipalities (see hypothesis H1b). Particularly, keeping all other 
explanatory variables fixed, a shift of the institutional setting from confederal (the 
reference group) to federal, would increase voter turnout by about 2.5% on 
average. These results support the idea that voters in federal municipalities 
perceive a larger net benefit of voting, which is driven by the fact that they can 
express a distinct preference for a set of policies (rather than a party) and have a 
higher probability of bringing such optimal outcome about. Similarly, all else 
remaining constant, a shift of the institutional setting from confederal to 
centralized, would decrease voter turnout by about 1.9 % on average. This is due 
to voters’ relatively small probabilities of being pivotal in favor of a desired 
policy, which reduces their incentive to vote at the margin.  
____________________ 
Table 3 about here 
____________________ 
Importantly, the above findings are driven by the institutional design, and do not 
reflect the effect of this design on the size of the electorate or the closeness of the 
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election (as we control for these elements directly). Turning to these control 
variables, we find that a closer election increases voter turnout, while a larger 
electorate as well as larger sub-electorates at the community level depress voter 
turnout, in line with earlier findings. Note that the quadratic effects are weak, such 
that the negative (sub-)electorate-turnout relation encompasses more than 99% of 
the entire sample. Higher migration and population density both show a negative 
– though statistically insignificant – relation to turnout, which may reflect the 
effect of weaker social ties (and, thus, social pressure to turn out) in densely 
populated areas and jurisdictions with high population turnover. Education also 
plays an important role: a larger share of highly (less-) educated residents has a 
positive (negative) effect on voter turnout. Interestingly, while the long-term 
unemployment rate returns a negative coefficient estimate, the short-run 
unemployment rate is positively related to voter turnout. Taking a (possibly 
unwarranted owing to the ecological fallacy) individual-level interpretation of this 
result, one could speculate that unemployment produces a decline of individual’s 
social networks and belief in political parties (both of which would depress voter 
turnout) only after some time. Hence, the lower costs of voting generally imputed 
to unemployed people may induce higher turnout only in the short run, but are 
more than offset in the long run by the social and political implications of 
(prolonged) unemployment. More research, however, would be required to 
validate such a proposition. 
Finally, we find that turnout rates are substantially lower in the former socialist 
eastern part of Germany, and that concurrent elections do not always increase 
voter turnout. More specifically, our findings suggest that concurrent state-level 
elections increase voter turnout, while the opposite appears to occur with respect 
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to concurrent EU elections. The latter could indicate that EU elections are still 
perceived as second-order elections. Still, some care should be taken in this 
interpretation since this result may be confounded by a potential time effect (since 
there is only one EU election in our sample and, hence, all concurrence between 
local and EU elections refers to the same point in time). 
5. Conclusion 
Building on the fiscal federalism and public choice literatures, this article 
provided a first look into the relation between the institutional design of (local) 
public good provision and voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that different 
institutional designs for public good provision affect voters’ turnout calculus at 
the margin by affecting the net benefit of voting on Election Day. The ensuing 
hypotheses were tested using a dataset on local-level elections in Germany, where 
a substantial variety of institutional designs can be observed in the provision of 
the same broad set of local public goods.  
Our inquiry provided two key results. First, and most generally, we found 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that institutions beyond those concerning 
the design of elections (such as compulsory voting, registration system, electoral 
system, postal or Sunday voting, quorum rules, concurrent elections) can have an 
effect on voter turnout. Second, we illustrate that (de-)centralization of (local) 
public good provision drives voters’ turnout decisions at the margin in line with 
predictions derived from a simple rational-choice Downsian framework. Voter 
turnout is lowest in fully centralized municipalities and highest in federal 
municipalities – compared to the reference group of confederal municipalities. 
Allowing voters to express more detailed preferences regarding local public goods 
depending on the geographic reach of these public goods thus increases turnout.  
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Within the Downsian framework adhered to in our theoretical discussion, 
decentralization increases voter turnout by increasing the perceived net benefit of 
casting a ballot in favor of one’s preferred policy bundle. Interestingly, a similar 
prediction can also be derived from an expressive voter perspective. One could 
indeed argue that expressive utility is highest in federal municipalities – compared 
to confederal and centralized municipalities – because two votes allow one to 
express more options (and thus gain more expressive utility) than does one vote. 
Still, the observed difference in turnout between confederal and centralized 
municipalities would appear harder to explain from such an expressive 
perspective – whereas it is compatible with the instrumental model. 
Overall, our findings support the classical idea – incorporated in the principles of 
fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) and the decentralization theorem (Oates 1972, 
1999) – that there should be a close relationship between the geographic reach of 
public goods and the decision authority responsible for their provision. Assigning 
responsibility to the ‘right’ level of government appears not to have positive 
effects only on the efficiency of public good provision (Olson 1969; Oates 1972, 
1999), but also on voter turnout. 
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Figure 1: Three types of local government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Benefit of voting under optimal policy choice (BFed) vs. optimal party choice (Bcen, BCon) 
 optimal policy choice   
 Party Y Party Z      
        
Ucom 1 2   BFed   = 31321 =−+−   
Umun 3 1      
        
 optimal party choice   
 Party Y Party Z      
        
Ucom 1 2  BCen =   BCon =  ( ) ( ) 11231 =+−+   
Umun 3 1      
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Table 1: Structure of the sample 
 
 
 
 
Federal state Date of election Concurrent 
elections 
Municipal type 
A  B  C 
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 2 March 2003  101  118  – 
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) 13 June 2004 EU  37  –  163 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW) 13 June 2004 EU  179  272  – 
Brandenburg (BB) 26 October 2003  143  54  – 
Mecklenburg-Western Pom. (MV) 13 June 2004 EU  52  97  – 
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 13 June 2004 EU  39  157  – 
Thuringia (TH) 13 June 2004 EU, state 118  130  – 
Total   669  828  163 
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Table 2: Variable definition and descriptive statistics (N=1660) 
Variable definition  Summary statistics 
Variable Description  Mean SD Min; Max 
Endogenous variable      
Turnout Votes cast / eligible voters  0.5483 0.0827 0.28; 0.77 
Explanatory variables      
Cen
iD  Dummy=1 for centralized municipalities  0.4753 0.4995 0; 1 
Fed
iD  Dummy=1 for federal municipalities  0.0982 0.2977 0; 1 
Electorate Number of eligible voters (in 1000)  9.914 8.5791 0.28; 80.05 
Sub-electorate Average number of eligible voters within sub-electorates of municipality (in 1000).  5.357 7.089 0.02; 80.05 
Closeness Difference between winner and runner-up   (in %)  0.2874 0.202 0;1 
Non-partisan votes Dummy=1 if average share of non-partisan votes exceeds 33.3%  0.5313 0.4992 0;1 
Population density Number of inhabitants per km2 (in 1000)  0.2476 0.3110 0.01;2.52 
Population mobility In- and out-migrants / total population   0.1144 0.0344 0.02; 0.54 
HHI age Herfindahl index of municipal age-structure  0.0698 0.0034 0.06; 0.11 
Long-term unemployment  Number unemployed over 12 months / total population  0.0282 0.0541 0; 0.73 
Short-term unemployment Number unemployed under 12 months / total population  0.0786 0.1310 0.0001; 1.73 
Education high %  population with university degree  0.0143 0.0197 0; 0.53 
Education low %  population without vocational training and without secondary school education  0.0334 0.0257 0; 0.25 
Dummy EU election Dummy=1 if concurrent EU election  0.7494 0.4335 0;1 
Dummy state election Dummy=1 if concurrent state election (only Thuringia)   0.1494 0.3566 0;1 
Dummy east Dummy=1 if municipality was in former GDR  0.4759 0.4996 0;1 
Dummy RP Dummy=1 if municipality is located in Rhineland-Palatinate  0.1205 0.3256 0;1 
Dummy BW Dummy=1 if municipality is located in Baden-Wuerttemberg  0.2717 0.445 0;1 
Dummy MV  Dummy=1 if municipality is located in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.  0.0898 0.2859 0;1 
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Table 3: Quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) estimation results 
Variable  Parameter estimates  Marginal effects 
  Coef. Std. error P>|z|  dy/dx Std. error 
Centralized Municipality  -0.0763 0.0209 0.000  -0.0189 0.0052 
Federal Municipality  0.1010 0.0400 0.012  0.0250 0.0099 
Sub-electorate  -0.0192 0.0041 0.000  -0.0038 0.0010 
Sub-electorate squared  0.0003 0.0000 0.001  – – 
Electorate  -0.0119 0.0021 0.000  -0.0024 0.0004 
Electorate squared  0.0001 0.0000 0.000  – – 
Closeness  0.3710 0.0849 0.000  -0.0038 0.0242 
Closeness squared  -0.2460 0.0905 0.007  – – 
Non-partisan votes  0.0571 0.0126 0.000  0.0141 0.0031 
Population Density  -0.0245 0.0263 0.352  -0.0061 0.0065 
Population Mobility  -0.2530 0.1590 0.111  -0.0627 0.0394 
HHI Age  2.2780 1.8960 0.230  0.5640 0.4694 
Short-term unemployment  0.9070 0.2810 0.001  0.2245 0.0696 
Long-term unemployment   -1.9500 0.6710 0.004  -0.4828 0.1661 
Education high  0.0003 0.0002 0.168  0.0001 0.0001 
Education low  -0.0020 0.0004 0.000  -0.0005 0.0001 
Dummy EU election  -0.2730 0.0220 0.000  -0.0677 0.0055 
Dummy state election  0.3980 0.0217 0.000  0.0985 0.0054 
Dummy East  -0.3300 0.0241 0.000  -0.0818 0.0060 
Dummy RP  0.3270 0.0435 0.000  0.0811 0.0108 
Dummy BW  0.2410 0.0304 0.000  0.0598 0.0075 
Dummy MV  0.1300 0.0230 0.000  0.0321 0.0057 
Constant  0.3950 0.1410 0.005  – – 
R2  0.672    
Number of observations  1,660    
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